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Introduction
Institutionalizing Northeast Asia:
Challenges and opportunities
Martina Timmermann
With North Korea going nuclear, tensions increasing in the Taiwan Strait
and repeated clashes between China and Japan as well as between South
Korea and Japan over territories that are thought to be rich in energy,
water or ﬁshing grounds, awareness has been sharpened that there is a
pressing need to provide plausible answers to a vital question: how can
lasting peace, order, stability and prosperity be achieved in Northeast
Asia?1
Globalization and China’s galloping economy have caused radically
different economic growth rates in Northeast Asia, resulting in constant
ﬂuctuations in the balance of power among the nations in the region.
Northeast Asia – which includes the People’s Republic of China (PRC),
Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), the Republic of Korea (South Korea), the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and Japan2 – is
the most heavily militarized region in the world.3 National security has
been the prevailing security paradigm in the countries of the region.
With new emerging threats to security – such as the Asian ﬁnancial cri-
sis in 1997, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and other health
epidemics, international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs) and trafﬁcking in humans and drugs – as well as prob-
lems posed by environmental degradation and disasters, awareness that
such threats can no longer be tackled by any country on an individual
basis has also increased. The old concept of sovereign independence thus
no longer offers satisfactory solutions. Alternative concepts are needed
that provide more plausible answers to these newly emerging challenges.
Institutionalizing Northeast Asia: Regional steps towards global governance, Timmermann
and Tsuchiyama (eds), United Nations University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-92-808-1156-8
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The concept of regional institutionalism
One concept that seems to offer promise in this particular context is ‘‘re-
gional institutionalism’’. Here, institutions can be understood as ‘‘persis-
tent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe
behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations’’.4 Such
institutions ‘‘may include organizations, bureaucratic agencies, treaties
and agreements, and informal practices that states [as well as non-state
actors] accept as binding’’.5
Supporters of regional institutionalism refer to the emerging strength
of regional and global players such as the European Union (EU) and
the World Trade Organization (WTO), the development of world norms
(such as human rights and free markets) and the increasing inﬂuence of
civil society as factors which, in combination, may challenge the still-
overwhelming power of the principle of sovereignty in East Asia and
have a fundamental impact on the development of a new world order
(see the chapters by Higgott and Timmermann, and Job and Evans, in
this volume).
In academic discourse6 the development of contemporary regionalism,
in all its different forms, is considered the key to understanding an
emerging new world order and structures of global governance. Within
this process, the intensiﬁcation of regionalism should be regarded as an
aspect of globalization, rather than refutation or evidence against it.
Originally, regional cooperative arrangements emerged primarily in
Europe and Latin America. The ‘‘new regionalism’’ of the late twentieth
century, however, saw a rise in regional organizations all over the world
in response to the challenges of economic globalization.7 During this
period new regional institutions began springing up, while pre-existing
institutions went through internal restructuring and expansion processes,
and formerly inactive organizations were revived. Regional cooperation
via regional institution building thereby seems to have been perceived as
the right ‘‘recipe’’ for nation-states to deal with the progressive erosion
of their regulatory and policy-making capacities in a rapidly globalizing
world.8
Regional institution building in Southeast Asia
Scholarly interest in regional institution building in East Asia has long
been focused on Southeast Asia, with its comparatively advanced in-
stitutional structures of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). There are also numerous studies on the Asia Paciﬁc Eco-
nomic Cooperation (APEC) and the Asia-Paciﬁc Rim. It is only since
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the end of the twentieth century that the focus of regionalization studies
has been shifting to the issue of bilateral or inter-regional regionalism,
with a clear focus on Asia-Europe cooperation.9
Within this context, the ASEAN summit in January 2007 provided
additional food for thought and analysis. Five agreements were signed
pertaining to continuing integration of ASEAN and enhancing political,
economic and social cooperation in the region, including the Cebu Decla-
ration on the blueprint for the ASEAN Charter. This declaration, in
which a group of eminent persons were entrusted to draw up the new
charter, with the particular task of developing a platform for regionally
shared values, is especially noteworthy. It represented a long-awaited re-
sponse to the demands of scholars and activists who have been working
hard towards a values-based ASEAN institution with an ASEAN iden-
tity, and culminating in an ASEAN regional human rights mechanism. It
was signed at the Thirteenth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in November
2007.
Among scholars, practitioners and activists, regionally shared values
and norms (as, for instance, those expressed in regional human rights
mechanisms) have long been regarded as essential for successful and sus-
tainable regional institution building, with a collective identity as a vital
component.10 In this context it is useful to remember the famous debates
of the 1990s on Asian values and identity, and their functions in support-
ing and shaping the process of ASEAN regionalization.
Discourses on Asian values and human rights: Vehicles for
identity building and regional institutionalization
Initially, the discussion of Asian values and human rights mainly focused
on the quality and efﬁciency of different development models. Some
government e´lites from Singapore and Malaysia opposed (for example,
in Foreign Affairs) the Western understanding of democracy and human
rights that they felt was to be imposed upon their states. To underline
the risks of simply transferring Western values to Asian countries, they
pointed at the increasing moral decay of Western countries, exempliﬁed
by growing public apathy and rising crime rates. To their understanding,
such factors were responsible for the decay of the West. They thought
that in Asia, limited individualism and strong work and savings ethics,
as well as taking responsibility for one’s personal life through focusing
on the family, led to the development successes of the 1980s and early
1990s. The problem with that argument, however, was not only the wool-
ly meaning of those values. More problematic was the attempt to justify
authoritarian states with their restrictions on political and civic rights
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such as freedom of opinion, and bans on political parties and political ac-
tivities. According to these governing e´lites, socio-economic rights had
priority, and political and civil rights had to wait until their societies
were ready for them. Western, mainly American, reproaches were re-
garded as either interference in their national affairs, envy of their devel-
opment successes or attempts to substitute former colonial imperialism
with new values imperialism.
This debate between Western and Asian e´lites lasted until the middle
of the 1990s. With the beginning of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis in July 1997
the situation changed. It is important to note, however, that the deliber-
ate use of the variables ‘‘identity’’ and ‘‘values’’ in such inter-regional
discussions was as important for inter-regional demarcation as for the
process of regional uniﬁcation.
Looking at the Asian values debate of the 1980s and the Asian eco-
nomic crises of the 1990s, there are interesting similarities with the
human rights and values discussions between Western and communist
countries in the 1970s. In those debates, led within the Helsinki process,
human rights arguments were used to legitimize different political and
economic systems and demarcate East and West. They were thereby
also taken up into the realm of security politics. Very similarly, political
and academic e´lites rhetorically differentiated Asian and Western values
and identity some 20 years later.
Such processes also reveal the importance of discourse. Identity does
not develop by itself, but in discourse with the social environment. Thus
the institutional frames of reference for such discourses, for example
regional conferences like ASEAN and now also the East Asian Summit,
gain in importance. This contrasts with the views of critics who refer to
such conferences as mere ‘‘talking shops’’.
A particularly interesting example, because it is directly related to the
Cebu initiative for the ASEAN Charter, is the ASEAN Working Group
for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism that formed in 1996, following
the Second World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, 1993. This
(quasi) non-governmental working group triggered a regional institution-
alization process that involved setting up national working group ofﬁces
in several ASEAN countries, organizing regular regional meetings, pro-
viding expert counselling and at least informally contributing to the
agenda setting of national and regional government meetings.11 Their
continuous efforts seem to have had some impact on the process of devel-
oping the ASEAN governmental initiative for a regional values platform
(mentioning human rights) announced during the ASEAN summits in
Cebu and Singapore in 2007.
Beyond the identity issue, the ASEAN approach reﬂects an important
shift in thinking from the traditional national security paradigm towards
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a more comprehensive human security framework, including long-
embattled values and human rights issues.12
The governments of the Southeast Asian subregion have realized that
in order to meet current and future challenges successfully, they need to
cooperate more closely and go beyond former limits and (self-)restraints.
However, is (sub)regional institution building also the right recipe for
Northeast Asia?
Challenges and opportunities for regional institution
building in Northeast Asia
The institutionalization of Northeast Asia has been widely regarded as
impossible.13 The reasons for this situation are complex and closely inter-
twined. A particular ‘‘set of conﬂicts’’ is considered to be the major im-
pediment to regional institution and identity building in Northeast Asia.
Challenge One: Solving a simmering ‘‘set of conﬂicts’’
Conﬂict over regional territories fuelled by debates on Japanese
wartime atrocities
Long-lasting disputes over regional territories that promise to ensure
access to oil, gas, water and ﬁshing grounds have been interlinked with
public disputes about Japan’s role in the Second World War, and further
fuelled by rising nationalism in Japan and China. Annual visits to the
Yasukuni shrine by the former Japanese Prime Minister, Junichiro Koi-
zumi, poured additional oil on to the ﬁres of these conﬂicts. China and the
Koreas, major victims of Japanese pre-war expansionist politics, consider
such visits and the glossing over of Japanese war atrocities (such as the
Nanking massacre or the ‘‘comfort women’’ issue) as attempts to white-
wash Japan’s past and even glorify its wartime history. In return, China
and the Koreas face criticism about creating a ‘‘victim’’ identity for polit-
ical convenience: political concerns raised over historical issues are stra-
tegically used to pursue their economic interests (for details see Berger
and Harris in this volume).
Conﬂicts over access to natural resources – Energy, water and
ﬁshing grounds
Access to natural resources has become a vital issue for all countries
in this region (see Ohta and Harris in this volume), but especially for
China and Japan. China surpassed Japan as the world’s second-largest
petroleum consumer in 2003, and has become the second-largest energy
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consumer after the United States. Before China (and, let it not be forgot-
ten, India) started its current path of development, Japan was the second-
largest energy importer after the United States. As the second-biggest
economic power in the world (if the European Union is counted as one
player, Japan would rank as number three), Japan is still the world’s
fourth-largest energy consumer. But China’s hunger for energy resources
is now matching Japan’s, and it is obvious that this increasing demand is
leading to growing competition for ownership of energy resources and
access to territorial areas with promising natural resources. Almost as a
side-effect, this has also caused competition between Japan and China at
the international diplomatic level – for instance, in their development ini-
tiatives in energy-rich regions of the world.
Increasing demand for energy has contributed to turning long-time
simmering conﬂicts into open conﬂicts, and sometimes even ﬁery clashes.
The Senkaku/Diaoyutai conﬂict
One such territorial conﬂict over energy access is the discussion between
Japan and China about the islands of Senkaku (Japanese) and Diaoyutai
(Chinese). This territorial conﬂict has been going on for almost 40 years,
but in 2004–2005 the debate on the islands reached a climax, with China
sending a nuclear submarine into the so-called ‘‘exclusive economic
zone’’ (EEZ) near the controversial islands in November 2004. In re-
sponse, the Japanese government issued a public declaration in February
2005 that emphasized its ofﬁcial possession of the Senkaku Islands, refer-
ring to existing treaties that had repeatedly been acknowledged by the
US government.14 This again caused China – which had additionally
been angered by repeated references to ‘‘Taiwan’’ in Japanese/US mili-
tary documents and declarations – to send a message to Japan warning
it to back off or ‘‘take full responsibility’’.
The Takeshima/Dokdo conﬂict
A similar dispute has been going on between Japan and South Korea
over the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands. Since 1954 the islands have been
inhabited and guarded by South Korea’s coastguard. Slowly but continu-
ously, South Korea has been supporting its claim by expanding infra-
structure on the islands. In spite of several Japanese protests, this issue
only really boiled up in 2004,15 when large hydrocarbon deposits were
found around the islands. Japan thereafter renewed its claim of owner-
ship of the islands. This governmental claim was strongly supported by
a growing group of conservative right-wingers in Japan who stressed
Japan’s entitlement to former colonial areas of its imperial past. The
situation further deteriorated in 2005, the ofﬁcial ‘‘year of friendship’’ be-
tween Koreans and Japanese.16 When the Shimane Prefectural Assembly
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in Japan decided to designate 22 February as ‘‘Takeshima Day’’ in order
to reiterate Japan’s territorial claim to the Takeshima Islands, the atmo-
sphere reached its negative climax.
The intertwinement of territorial issues with historical events was
stressed again when Shinzo Abe was elected Japanese Prime Minister
on 26 September 2006. With Junichiro Koizumi out of ofﬁce, Chinese
state media expressed their hope for an improvement in Sino-Japanese
relations. Soon after, the new prime minister was invited by the Chinese
Premier, Wen Jibao, for an ofﬁcial visit to China. This invitation to China
was the ﬁrst issued to a leading Japanese politician in years, and it sig-
nalled a turning point from the Chinese side. However, when Shinzo
Abe argued in the Diet on 6 October 2006 that the 14 convicted war
criminals enshrined at Yasukuni were not war criminals under domestic
Japanese law, but had been tried for crimes against peace and humanity
– concepts that had been created by the Allies after the war and forced
upon Japan as loser of the war17 – he caused new uproars in China and
the Koreas.
Abe’s comment was only the most prominent among a number of
similar comments that had previously been made by other Japanese poli-
ticians. The devastating impact of such remarks on public opinion in
China and Korea had already been felt in 2005 with a consumer boycott
of Japanese goods, culminating in outbreaks of violent protests against
Japanese enterprises.
The Senkaku conﬂict during that time poured more oil on to the ﬂames
of anti-Japanese demonstrations in April 2005, as did the release of his-
tory books for (some) middle schools in Tokyo which left out important
facts regarding Japan’s role in the Second World War. Japanese public
opinion towards China turned equally sour, reaching its negative cli-
max18 in December 2005 when the Japanese Foreign Minister, Taro
Aso, said, with unusual frankness, that China’s double-digit military
growth for 17 years, its lack of military transparency and its possession
of nuclear weapons posed a threat to Japanese security.19
The conﬂict over the Kuril Islands/northern archipelago
A third territorial conﬂict, simmering between Japan and Russia since
the end of the Second World War, concerns the ownership of the four
islands at the northern tip of the Japanese archipelago, the so-called
Kuril Islands: Shikotan, Habomai, Etorofu and Kunashiri. They have
been regarded as being of strategic military relevance, and have rich ﬁsh-
ing grounds. The lack of resolution to this dispute has meant that, as of
today, no peace treaty has been concluded between Russia and Japan.
The set of conﬂicts outlined above have widely been regarded as a
substantial impediment to regional institution building in Northeast
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Asia. They also clearly illustrate the need for Japan and China, as the
biggest economic players in the region, to settle their issues ﬁrst if re-
gional institutionalization in Northeast Asia is to translate into sustain-
able development.
Challenge Two: Facing a shifting balance of power through de
facto economic regionalization
China’s rise is fundamentally altering the balance of power in the region,
and with new threats emerging – and more and more non-governmental
actors joining the political game – there has been a shift towards institu-
tionalizing Northeast Asia. This shift has two parents.
Apart from the simple, but urgent, need for peaceful resolution of
territorial conﬂicts, the business community20 has urgently pushed for
stronger regional economic and ﬁnancial cooperation. The Asian ﬁnan-
cial crisis of 1997, which highlighted the full power of complex global eco-
nomic intertwinement, proved to be the watershed. Pempel, Weiss and
Iida, for instance, argue in their political and economic analyses in this
volume that de facto or market-led trade and investment integration in
East Asia has already reached a state of regionalization that, quoting
Iida, ‘‘is unprecedented in the history of this region’’. Higgott and
Timmermann point to the consequence of this de facto economic trend:
the relationship between the United States and East Asia is becoming
more economically symmetrical, with the result that the bilateral strategic
architecture is gradually being dismantled. They argue that this de facto
economic regionalization should not be seen as distinguished from, but
rather interlinked with, de jure state-led regionalism. This will require
positive thinking about regional leadership issues.
Challenge Three: Taking up the issue of leadership while managing
the United States
At this point, ﬁnally, the role of the United States as a geographically
extra-regional but economically and politically coining power needs to
be taken up for discussion, because it was the United States that for half
a century rendered any regional leadership ambitions of the PRC and
Japan impossible.
In the case of the PRC, regional leadership was obstructed for ideolog-
ical reasons, with the ‘‘Taiwan’’ issue also being a continuous thorn in the
ﬂesh of US-Chinese relationships. In the case of Japan, regional leader-
ship ambitions were obstructed as a result of particular debilitating his-
torical circumstances. Japan, defeated in the Second World War and
urgently needing to rebuild the country and its economy, committed itself
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to the principle of ‘‘comprehensive security’’ which allowed it to focus on
economic recovery and performance while being protected by the US
security shield (see Tsuchiyama in this volume).
With China’s economic rise, and the resulting economic and ﬁnancial
ﬂows, the situation has changed fundamentally. Regional neighbours Ja-
pan and the Republic of Korea have decided to jump on the bandwagon
instead of trying to hold out against China’s booming development. They
have progressively turned towards China, with its lower production costs
and import and export opportunities.21 In this process, the PRC has
taken over the former US position as the biggest trading partner of both
Japan and South Korea.
It will therefore be up to China and Japan, as the biggest economic
powers in the region, to decide on how to deal with this leadership issue.
What form will regional institutionalization take in
Northeast Asia?
As a result of the aforementioned developments, the question is clearly
no longer if regional institutionalization will take place, but rather what
form it will take, who the drivers (and spoilers) will be and which path
they will pursue. Within this context, a closely related question is: do
such trends in the economic sector have the potential to spill over into
other sectors?
A study by the US American Congress Research Service from April
2005 (that is, partly before the conﬂicts on history and territories between
Japan and China heated up again) found the ﬁrst indicators of such a
trend. The authors conclude that ‘‘deepening economic cooperation has
already increased the costs of disrupting economic and ﬁnancial activity
in Northeast Asia, by a military or other crisis’’; that the process, as
such, is ‘‘self-motivating, self-perpetuating, and self-sustaining’’;22 and
that ‘‘the magnitude of the economic ﬂows is affecting relations at other
strata of interaction, such as stronger cooperation on political disputes
between Japan, China and South Korea’’23 (see Weiss in this volume).
On the other hand, increasing economic competition between Japan
and China may cause additional conﬂict. In trade, for instance, China
and Japan have long complemented each other, with Japan as a high-
tech power and China as a provider of cheap goods; but China is now in-
creasingly becoming competitive in the high-tech sector. Also, the issue
of intellectual property rights is vital to Japan, which wants the topic to
be discussed within the framework of the WTO. Japan still tends to em-
phasize the advantages of China’s rise, but Japanese government repre-
sentatives cannot always hide their unease. This was best exempliﬁed in
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a remark by the Japanese Trade Minister, Shoichi Nakagawa, who pub-
licly admitted, ‘‘Yes, I am worried . . . It’s a scary country.’’24
To international observers, China’s rise as an economic powerhouse
and its growing role as a regional political power – combined with its
non-transparent military spending policy – give reason to watch China’s
policy carefully (see Takagi in this volume).
In an attempt to avoid being perceived as a threat, China has been try-
ing to emphasize its policy of a ‘‘peaceful rise’’ by starting diplomatic ini-
tiatives in the region – for instance, acting as mediator in the Six-Party
Talks on North Korea’s nuclear disarmament25 (see Kikuchi, Lee and
Aoi in this volume).
With health epidemics, human trafﬁcking and environmental degrada-
tion, so-called ‘‘soft’’ issue areas have become the centre of attention and
made their way into security discussions. The issue of refugees and mi-
gration, for instance, has been a thorn in the ﬂesh of otherwise friendly
relations between North Korea and China (see Akaha and Ettkin in this
volume).
Steps towards institutionalization, therefore, seem to have gained ac-
ceptance and accelerated beyond the economic sphere of interaction.
This process is further enhanced by the increasing involvement of non-
governmental actors. As unpopular as non-governmental actors may be
among government representatives, human trafﬁcking, environmental
degradation and disasters among others are challenges that reach beyond
national borders and the capabilities of individual national governments.
Consequently, the emerging importance of civil society and its potential
role in meeting such challenges are vital (see Lee, Aoi, Ohta and de
Prado in this volume).
Closely related to such trends has been the wide acceptance and popu-
larity of the ‘‘human security’’ concept in East Asia (and elsewhere) that
best captures such developments, and sees a good chance that these
aforementioned developments can provide the long-sought-after ground
for overcoming the traditional security focus and pave the way for re-
gional institution building in Northeast Asia (see Job and Evans in this
volume).
The complexity of issues shaping the situation and perspective of
Northeast Asian regional institutionalization has been the organizing
logic for the approach and structure of this volume.
Approach and structure of this volume
The process of organizing this volume started out with the ambitious idea
of providing an overall approach and deﬁnitions equally satisfactory to
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all authors. During a workshop discussion in Tokyo, 20–22 September
2005, it became evident, however, that not only the judgements of the
situation but also the perspectives on regionalization in Northeast Asia
were very dependent on the topic, as was the problem of which countries
to include in individual analyses. Thus, to several authors, the focus on
Northeast Asia as a (sub)region comprising only Japan, the PRC, Chi-
nese Taipei, South Korea and North Korea seemed artiﬁcial, and they
demanded a more open approach for analysis when needed.
Similarly, the deﬁnition and understanding of ‘‘institutionalization’’
and ‘‘integration’’ proved tricky in some cases, this time depending on
the scientiﬁc perspective of the authors – that is, whether authors were
coming from political science or economic backgrounds.
In order to overcome such difﬁculties and provide a common ground
and framework of reference, ﬁrstly all authors were asked to address
four guiding questions with regard to Northeast Asia, in light of their par-
ticular areas of expertise.
 Do the theory and practice of regional institutionalization provide
plausible answers to the speciﬁc challenges of Northeast Asia?
 What are the premises and prospects of such processes in Northeast
Asia?
 Which steps have to be taken?
 Have the processes of globalization paved the way for regional institu-
tionalization in Northeast Asia and made what many observers deem
seemingly ‘‘impossible’’ ﬁnally possible?
Secondly, in response to the variety of challenges and opportunities
for institutionalizing Northeast Asia, and taking into consideration the
academic and intellectual challenges for analysis as well as remembering
UNU’s mission to provide a platform for academic exchange and policy
development on issues of global concern, it was decided to subdivide the
volume into two major parts.
Part I provides a general theoretical starting ground and frame of ref-
erence. It tackles issues of overarching concern, including reﬂections on
theory, normative issues and some lessons learnt in a comparative con-
text with the European Union.
In part II authors analyse different topic areas and develop particular
policy recommendations related to Northeast Asia. The aforementioned
difﬁculty of agreeing on single deﬁnitions of institutionalism, regionaliza-
tion and so forth, which has also been reﬂected in many other volumes
about regionalism in East Asia,26 illustrates well that regionalism can
no longer be reduced to the idea of territorial politics alone. Instead,
regionalism needs to take into account the growing intertwinement of
global issues and developments with both needs and interests at the re-
gional and national levels and, accordingly, the demand for issue-related
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supra-territorial policy responses to issues such as trade, ﬁnance, environ-
ment, human rights and human security.
In response to this, the second part of this book is further subdivided
into four topic areas: history, ideas and identity; security; economy and
ﬁnance; and environment, human rights, civil society and human security.
Here authors (with varying degrees of optimism and scepticism) discuss
the situation and potentials of future regional institution building in
Northeast Asia from their particular angle of expertise.
The chapters in part I
Three chapters, by Yoshinobu Yamamoto, Richard Higgott and Martina
Timmermann, and Baogang He, serve as a general framework of refer-
ence for the chapters which follow. They offer deﬁnitions of institutional-
ism and regionalism, and provide an overview of the scientiﬁc debate on
regional institutionalism in East Asia (i.e. Northeast and Southeast Asia),
with a particular focus on Northeast Asia.
Yoshinobu Yamamoto provides a particular theoretical frame of refer-
ence for later authors with his chapter, ‘‘Institutionalization in Northeast
Asia: Is outside-in regionalization enough?’’. In discussing the possibil-
ities of creating multilateral institutions in Northeast Asia, Yamamoto
starts by deﬁning the concepts of ‘‘institution’’ and ‘‘institutionalization’’
and then proceeds to discuss the functions of institutionalization. He
develops a typology of institutions and institutionalization before ﬁnally
applying his theoretical framework to the case of Northeast Asia.
Richard Higgott and Martina Timmermann debate ‘‘Institutionalizing
East Asia: Learning lessons from Europe on regionalization, regionalism,
identity and leadership’’. They analyse the prospects for regional institu-
tionalization in East Asia in the early twenty-ﬁrst century by deliberately
choosing the comparative context of Europe, and consider the role of
identity building and regional leadership as vital for the future process
of institutionalizing Northeast Asia.
The third chapter in part I, by Baogang He, examines the state of nor-
mative regionalism and its impact in East Asia. He provides an overview
of the historical evolution of the idea of regionalism, and the meanings
and variations of Asian regionalism.
The chapters in part II
The section on ‘‘history, ideas and identity’’ contains analyses by Gilbert
Rozman, Thomas Berger and Takashi Oshimura.
Gil Rozman, in his chapter ‘‘Northeast Asian regionalism at a cross-
roads: Is an East Asian Community in sight?’’, discusses the various
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reasons for and challenges standing in the way of the creation of an ‘‘East
Asian Community’’. He demands the acknowledgement of barriers (such
as historical factors) as a prerequisite for any successful regionalism, and
criticizes an overly strong focus on the functionalist approach while
neglecting to close the cultural divide.
Thomas Berger, in ‘‘Overcoming a difﬁcult past: The history problem
and institution building in Northeast Asia’’, explores the possibilities
for regionalization by reviewing the underlying nature of international
disputes over history issues. Berger traces the evolution of the disputes
in Asia since 1945, and focuses in particular on the ways in which dis-
putes over the past have disrupted regional diplomacy and institutional
development.
Takashi Oshimura, in ‘‘The function and dysfunction of identity in an
institutionalizing process: The case of Northeast Asia’’, explores options
for the creation or further development of a regional identity and dis-
cusses the question of how such an identity might contribute to regional
institutionalization.
In the next section, following the analyses of historical and ideational
causes and the prerequisites for regional institution building, Jitsuo
Tsuchiyama, Shin-wha Lee, Seiichiro Takagi, Chiyuki Aoi and Tsutomu
Kikuchi analyse the various security challenges and discuss their poten-
tial impact on regional institution building in Northeast Asia.
Jitsuo Tsuchiyama raises the question ‘‘Do the alliance networks in
Northeast Asia contribute to peace and stability? The Japan-US alliance
in focus’’. Tsuchiyama, who is among the sceptics in this book, discusses
the changing roles and rationale of the alliances after the end of the Cold
War, with a particular focus on the Japan-US alliance.
Shin-wha Lee, in ‘‘Northeast Asian security community: From
concepts to practices’’, puts particular emphasis on the questions of why
multilateral cooperation between South Korea, Japan and China is so dif-
ﬁcult, and how possible strategies and action plans for cooperation can be
developed in the areas of both traditional and non-traditional security.
Seiichiro Takagi, in his chapter ‘‘The Chinese approach to regional
security institutionalism’’, seeks to elucidate China’s approach to institu-
tionalization in the security ﬁeld. In a step-by-step analysis, Takagi dis-
cusses China’s actions and perceptions related to different institutions in
the bilateral, subregional and regional realms.
Chiyuki Aoi critically discusses ‘‘The Proliferation Security Initiative
from an institutional perspective: An ‘outside-in’ institution?’’. Aoi
suggests that ‘‘for the PSI to be genuinely effective, it needs to be
transformed from a largely US-initiated, US-driven activity into a more
multilateral, universal institution whose ‘outside-in’ potential can then
be explored in the context of Northeast Asia’’.
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Tsutomu Kikuchi joins the security debate with his chapter ‘‘Institu-
tional linkages and security governance: Security multilateralism in the
Korean peninsula’’. Using the Six-Party Talks as a reference example,
Kikuchi argues that one effective approach towards security multilaterism
in Northeast Asia could be through interlinking existing and new institu-
tional mechanisms.
Whereas the authors of the sections on ideas, history and security
strike a rather sceptical chord, we ﬁnd some cautiously optimistic tunes
in the third section, where Keisuke Iida, T. J. Pempel, John Weiss and
Stuart Harris discuss different areas of economic, ﬁnancial and energy
cooperation.
Keisuke Iida examines the dynamic trade and investment diplomacy in
East Asia. He stresses that not only the role of China but also three other
factors need to be taken into consideration for success: ‘‘ASEAN integra-
tion, economic stagnation and reform in Japan, and acquiescence by the
United States’’.
T. J. Pempel, in ‘‘Firebreak: East Asia institutionalizes its ﬁnances’’,
points to the question of why ‘‘a number of new institutional moves
suggest that the countries of Asia are becoming more internally cohesive
in ways that do not systematically include extra-Asian participants’’.
Pempel observes that numerous connections across Asia have been
developed since the mid-1980s, and that Asia’s previous predisposition
towards informality is changing to the direction of more formal and insti-
tutionalized connections within the area of ﬁnance.
John Weiss looks at ‘‘China and its neighbours: Patterns of trade and
investment’’. Weiss analyses from a particular economic perspective how
far the potential economic beneﬁts for the region created by China’s
rapid growth will stimulate and support moves towards institutionaliza-
tion. He rests his analysis on the assumption that closer mutual coopera-
tion between nation-states, as part of the process of institutionalization,
requires that closer economic ties are not only mutually beneﬁcial but
also need to be perceived as such.
Stuart Harris, in ‘‘Institutionalizing Northeast Asia: The energy mar-
ket’’, regards several Northeast Asian energy issues as a potential basis
for regional cooperation. He wonders, however, whether gains from co-
operation are countered by the political risks that cooperation implies.
The last section in part II contains analyses by Hiroshi Ohta, Ce´sar de
Prado, Tsuneo Akaha and Brian Ettkin, and Brian Job and Paul Evans.
Ohta takes up the environmental problem in ‘‘A small leap forward:
Regional cooperation for attacking the problems of the environment
and natural resources in Northeast Asia’’. He examines major environ-
ment and natural resources (ENR) problems and the current state of re-
gional ENR cooperation in Northeast Asia.
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In ‘‘Multilevel regionalization through think-tanks, higher education
and multimedia’’, Ce´sar de Prado argues that knowledge-enhancing ex-
changes are helping to construct a soft Northeast Asian regional space
embedded in concentric multilevel regionalisms. He concedes that North-
east Asian governments have begun to promote regional think-tank net-
works of experts from public and private sectors, but demands further
strengthening and rationalizing.
The need for creating a knowledge-based civil society in Northeast
Asia is exceptionally important in the ﬁeld of human rights and human
migration – topics that are tackled by Tsuneo Akaha and Brian Ettkin
in their chapter, ‘‘International migration and human rights: A case for
a regional approach in Northeast Asia’’. Akaha and Ettkin examine the
potential value of a regional approach to protecting the human rights of
international migrants in Northeast Asia.
The ﬁnal chapter, ‘‘Human security and Northeast Asia: Seeds germi-
nating on hard ground’’ by Brian Job and Paul Evans, is deliberately
placed at the end of this part of the book. Job and Evans explore the
manner in which Northeast Asian states are coming to terms with the
challenges of human security. They conclude that ‘‘For Northeast Asia,
the imperatives of human security may provide a logic for multilateral in-
stitutionalism that transcends traditional security dilemmas and, indeed,
may lay the foundation for their eventual resolution.’’
This conclusion would serve well as a ﬁne last sentence for the whole
volume. It will ultimately be up to the reader, however, to decide
whether the chapters in this book provide sufﬁcient and compelling argu-
ments to draw a conclusion, whether the chances for regionalization
through institutionalization in Northeast Asia exist, and whether and
how the various steps suggested by the contributors could and should be
taken up in the challenging process of achieving lasting order, stability
and prosperity in (and beyond) Northeast Asia.
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